



# Creating Infrastructures for Peace – Experiences at Three Continents

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*"Essentially, the aim should be the creation of a sustainable national infrastructure for peace that allows societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally and with their own skills, institutions and resources."*

*Former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan<sup>1</sup>*

## Introduction

Most countries lack the capacities and structures to deal adequately with on-going and potential violent conflict. 'Infrastructures for Peace' (I4P) refers to building standing capabilities or infrastructures for peacebuilding and prevention within countries, communities and regions, involving the main stakeholders. Often much focus and resources are given to external organisations and experts in Northern countries, intervening in other countries. With I4P the focus is on building capacities and structures *within* countries, regions and communities.

These peace structures have a real impact: several times in the past two decades they have proven to be effective tools for preventing or reducing violence (South Africa, prior to the elections in 1994; during recent elections in Ghana and Kenya). There is an increasing interest in I4P, which is important because experts expect an increase in violent conflicts.<sup>2</sup>

### The concept of Infrastructures for Peace

The well-known scholar and practitioner John Paul Lederach introduced this concept in his book *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997): *"I have a rather modest thesis. I believe that the nature and characteristics of contemporary conflict suggest the need for a set of concepts and approaches that go beyond traditional statist diplomacy. Building peace in today's conflicts calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources of reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside."*<sup>3</sup>

Lederach's model included the need for structural transformation. Infrastructure, in his view, is not a rigid structure but a process: a functional network that spans across divisions and levels of society and ensures optimum collaboration between the main stakeholders. *"As such, a platform is responsive to day-to-day issues that arise in the ebb and flow of conflict while it sustains a clear vision of the longer-term change needed in the destructive relational patterns. The creation of such a platform, I would submit, is one of the fundamental building blocks for supporting constructive social change over time."*

Belgian scientist Luc Reyhler used the concept of 'architecture' or 'infrastructure' for peace to describe a fairly wide variety of coordinated and focussed peacebuilding strategies at all levels of society. His aim is to create a more effective system to prevent violence.<sup>4</sup>

Both terms, infrastructure and architecture, are metaphors. The attraction of the 'architecture' metaphor, as explained by Reyhler, is that an architectural project requires imagination, planning, involving all stakeholders, building blocks for different types of conflicts and effective implementation.

'Infrastructure' conveys the image of extensive networks, that connect sections of a society in various ways and enables productive interaction. Both descriptions embody the ideas of involving main stakeholders in peacebuilding as a joint responsibility of society as a whole and using all available resources, capacities, mechanisms and structures for sustainable peace.

A broad definition of Infrastructures for Peace was drafted at a meeting in Kenya, February 2010. Representatives of governments, political parties, civil society and UN Country Teams from 14 African countries came together in Naivasha and agreed on a definition of I4P as a "*dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society.*"<sup>5</sup>

Another description is more specific: establishing a national infrastructure for peace could include:

- adopting a cooperative, problem-solving approach to conflict, based on dialogue and non-violence, which includes all main stakeholders;
- developing institutional mechanisms, appropriate to each country's culture, which promote and manage this approach at local, district and national levels.<sup>6</sup>

An even shorter description is: institutional capabilities for peacebuilding, prevention and post-war recovery.

In his article *Building National Infrastructures for Peace* Chetan Kumar described many different forms of activities, such as organising a national dialogue; establishing a network of local mediators easing tensions among communities; providing quiet support for national efforts to reach a political agreement on the new draft constitution; assisting with implementing an early warning and response system by governments and CSOs; supporting advocacy campaigns for peace and establishing or strengthening Peace Committees at all levels.<sup>7</sup>

Establishing a Peace Infrastructure can be a complex process and it may take a long time before it is an inclusive, well-functioning peace

infrastructure. It took Kenya 20 years and Ghana 8 years to establish a Peace infrastructure, and in both countries it is still work in progress.

This work has been advanced and expanded in many countries by the invaluable work of the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).

In some countries governments have established a Ministry of Peace<sup>8</sup>; in other countries Local Peace Committees have been set up by civil society, without government involvement in the beginning. The Wajir Peace and Development Committee in Kenya is a well-known example in this respect (see chapter 6). The process towards an I4P in the case of Kenya started informally, at district level, but gained momentum and became a national policy. This process took twenty years. A similar process took place in Ghana, involving some eight years. Despite these successful examples, there is a real danger that a Ministry or even a newly created Ministry of Peace in the end will be not use the great potential of other stakeholders, but will try to implement peacebuilding from above.

There is an enormous diversity of activities, tools, mechanisms and structures related to Infrastructures for Peace, as well as the number of options on how to involve governments.<sup>9</sup>

### Nicaragua and Ghana

#### Nicaragua

In *Building Peace*, Lederach describes peace commissions and elaborates on Nicaragua in the late 1980s.<sup>10</sup> Throughout the 1980s, multiple internal wars raged in Central America. This tragic period was formally ended with the Central American peace accord, signed in Guatemala by five countries (1987). The Nicaraguan government moved quickly to set up a national peace commission, region-specific commissions and a network of local commissions.

In fact, two independent systems of peace commissions were established. In the south of Nicaragua, religious leaders joined

forces at the peak of the war to negotiate conflict-free zones, forming small commissions of local residents to foster dialogue between the Sandinista government and contra rebels at the community level. Their original mission was to document and investigate human rights violations. Over time, it came to include all sorts of intra-community disputes, land conflicts and crime. By 1990, sixty commissions had arisen. The model for this conciliation effort was that of an insider-partial mediation effort, involving intermediaries from within the conflict who as individuals enjoyed the trust and confidence of one side, but who as team provided balance in their mediation work.

The second type of peace commission, as a component of the regional peace settlement, was the International support and Verification Commission (CIAV) of the Organisation of American States, which started work in 1990. It was originally charged with overseeing the demobilisation of over 22,000 contra combatants in the northern and western regions of the country. By 1995, the CIAV supported the creation of 96 peace commissions working on mediation, verification of human rights protections, promotion of human rights and facilitation of community projects. The peace commissions permitted an unprecedented space for dialogue in which citizens could safely express their views.

## Ghana

Ghana has had a stable and democratic government since 1992, but is burdened with a troubled past of military coups and dictatorial rule. At the surface, present Ghana is peaceful.<sup>11</sup> A study commissioned by the Ministry of Interior however identified several conflict factors, including chieftancy, civil and labour unrest, inter/intra-political party conflicts, land-, religion-, ethnic/identity conflicts, minerals and economic resources. One of those conflicts, the Konkomba-Nanumba war in 1994-1995, left 5,000 people dead. Another serious conflict erupted in 2002 in the northern region. The government of Ghana feared that these

events might derail upcoming elections. The regional government established the Northern Region Peace Advisory Council in 2004 as a mediation and conflict resolution mechanism. In 2006 the government decided to establish a National Architecture for Peace, with a National Peace Council, Regional Peace Councils and District Peace Councils. In March 2011 the National Peace Council Bill was unanimously adopted by Parliament.<sup>12</sup>

## Rationale of I4P

The world is not becoming a safer and more secure place. The opposite seems to happen.

Violent conflict has emerged as a central obstacle to the attainment of equitable and sustainable development. According to the World Bank, some 1.5 billion people live in fragile and conflict affected contexts in some 90 countries. Many of these are caught in what could be referred to as a ‘violence trap’.<sup>13</sup>

New, dynamic developments, like the Arab Spring, increase instability. There is also a growing trend that elections become more contested and violent, as happened in DRC, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Kenya. Elections become triggers for dormant, unsolved conflicts. Because the root causes of injustice, lack of security and deep grievances are not addressed, those feelings and resentments flare up during elections. A region like West Africa counted several civil wars in the nineties and the beginning of this century. For some time there was a development towards more stability, but that has now stopped or is being reversed: countries like Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria have begun to show a pattern of more violent conflicts in recent years.

Many countries have a huge potential for violent conflict, but lack adequate analysis, mechanisms and structures to deal with this. The usual government response is to reinforce law and order. In many (parts of) countries, however, government is not providing security and justice for its citizens, or groups of them. Many governments are fragile or highly polarized. Interethnic tensions are rising, societies are

becoming more divided on core issues and politics becomes involved with gangs and criminality.

Experts expect an increase in conflicts on competition for scarce resources, added to existing grievances between groups. *"As a result of the economic downturn, climate change and the growing depletion of resources, from arable land to water to oil, disputes within and between States may become more common in the future."*<sup>14</sup>

Outside intervention to address a violent conflict in a country has become more complicated and obsolete. Instead of intervening in countries we'd better assist them to build their own capacities in preventing and solving conflicts. As former SGUN Kofi Annan described it in his 2006 Review report on Conflict Prevention: *"Essentially, the aim should be the creation of a sustainable national infrastructure for peace."*<sup>15</sup> During the recent two decades it has been shown that this approach is fruitful. South Africa successfully pioneered a peace structure during the years preceding elections in 1994, building mechanisms at local, and regional levels that effectively stopped the escalation of violence. In Ghana and Kenya the existence of Peace Committees has reduced or prevented violence during elections. Additionally, investing in Peace Infrastructures is highly cost-effective.

## Components of I4P

The concept of Infrastructures for Peace is relatively new. There is no agreed definition of I4P; descriptions are sometimes very broad. That means that it is not easy to identify its different components but the policy documents of two pioneering countries, Ghana and Kenya, are helpful. Both have developed an I4P in a very solid and inclusive process over a period of between ten and twenty years. In 2011, Ghana institutionalised its Peace Architecture in the National Peace Council Act. In 2001, Kenya established a Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and after many consultations produced a *Final version of National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management* (December 2011).<sup>16</sup> From these two policy documents we can learn more about the main components, the pillars under the Infrastructures for Peace.

**Peace Committees.** It is very important to have a peace structure at all levels, national, district and local. These committees consist in general of highly respected persons who are capable of bridging political divides and possess competence, knowledge and experience in matters of conflict transformation and peace (in some cases, it might be appropriate to have representatives from opposing parties within the peace committees). The work of the Peace Committees has to be guided by bipartisanship and independence. Their main objectives are violence reduction, promoting dialogue, problem solving, community building and reconciliation.

A **National Peacebuilding Platform or Forum** will be a platform of the main stakeholders in peacebuilding, for consultation and cooperation.

**Conflict Analysis and Early Warning & Response System.** Crucial is a thorough conflict analysis and follow-up program how to deal with the different conflicts and set up an Early Warning & Response system.

A **Peace Building Support Unit** will be established at the government, often the Ministry of Interior. This Unit will develop the overall government policy on peacebuilding together with the National Peace Committee and Platform and implement it.

A **Bill on Infrastructures for Peace** will be the result of an intensive process of consulting the main stakeholders, at all levels.

**Building national capacities for peace.** The aim is to increase the capacity of peacebuilding institutions of government, departments, peace committees and others, including CSO groups. Broad based skills training will be offered to functionaries, public servants or members of civil society in peacebuilding, including conflict analysis, conflict early warning and response, conflict resolution and supporting dialogue processes.

**Involvement of insider mediators.** The development and application of national and local capacities requires sustained accompaniment, where specialists assist their counterparts in overcoming initial suspicion and hostility by developing relations of trust and then impart skills for negotiation and mediation. Strengthening the role of insider mediators is very important; Peace and Development advisors from UNDP can play those roles as well.

**Traditional perspectives on conflict resolution.** Traditional perspectives, understanding and solutions to conflict will be offered and strengthened.

**Promotion of a shared vision of society and a culture of peace.** Common values and a shared vision of society will be promoted and policies and structures established to implement them. Values of reconciliation, tolerance, trust and confidence building, mediation and dialogue as responses to conflict will be highlighted.

**Peace Education** and the celebration of the International Day of Peace, September 21st, will be part of such an overall policy.

**Budget.** Peacebuilding and conflict management intervention strategies require long-term funding by governments, donors, NGOs and communities.

**Establishing, implementing and monitoring an Infrastructure for Peace.** In the initial phase of establishing an infrastructure, main stakeholders will be consulted: government and non-state actors and different sectors of society at the national, district and local level. Analysing the root causes of conflict in a country shall be a participatory and inclusive effort. When such a policy has been approved, it has to be operationalized and regular assessments have to be executed.

These components are not a straitjacket, but possible pillars of a national infrastructure for peace. It is essential that each process, structure and mechanism is authentic and designed by the stakeholders themselves or in close collaboration with the main stakeholders.

### Kenya, Colombia and the Philippines

#### Kenya

*National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management  
Final version, December 2011.*<sup>17</sup>

Chapter Five: Pillars of the policy.

The policy has six key pillars that are critical to the achievement of the overall goal. It underscores the need for conflict sensitive planning and programming at all levels of regional, sub-regional, national and community development. These pillars are:

- Institutional Framework
- Capacity Building
- Conflict Prevention
- Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy
- Traditional Conflict Prevention and Mitigation
- Post-Conflict Recovery and Stabilisation.

#### Chapter Six: Institutional framework

- The Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, envisaged as the Parent Ministry, shall in collaboration with other Stakeholders, develop a framework for the implementation of this policy. The envisaged framework will provide for the establishment of a collaborative mechanism to operationalize this policy pending the establishment of the NPC. In addition, the framework will provide for capacity building and financing mechanisms.

- The National Peace Council
- The Council Secretariat
- County Peace Secretariat
- Local Peace Committees
- Stakeholders' Peace Fora
- The Legal framework
- Funding for the Peace Infrastructure
- Monitoring and Evaluation
- Policy review

## Colombia

Colombia has a history of four decades of internal armed conflict.<sup>18</sup> Especially the last fifteen years experience has grown with some components of Infrastructures for Peace: Local Peace Committees, large Peace constituencies, a National Peace Council and a High Commissioner for Peace and Reintegration.

LPCs, Peace Communities, Peace Laboratories, Zones of Peace are (or have been) flourishing in some of the most vulnerable conflict zones. The main objective of most LPCs is that local communities declare themselves a zone of peace to obtain protection from the surrounding violence. Many organised themselves into associations of peace communities to obtain more bargaining power with the armed actors.

Most LPCs established institutions to ensure maximum participation in decision making, a 'Constituent Assembly', open general assemblies or Municipal Forums for all members of the community. Working committees met every month, on specific issues, with representatives of unions, the church, youth & women organisations, etc. Such forums started to conduct diagnostic assessments to determine the causes of violence and poverty in each community, and to draw up a development and peace plan for the community. At national level, 4,000 Colombians gathered in 1998, one week before the inauguration of president-elect Pastrana (who had promised to negotiate peace with guerrilla groups) and held a Permanent Assembly of Civil Society for Peace.

In 1998, peace negotiations started between rebel forces and the government. A National Peace Council was set up including government and CSO representatives. The government never involved CSOs in the peace negotiations and the NPC did not make significant progress towards peace.

President Pastrana's successor Uribe recognised the paramilitary unit United Self-Defence Forces, AUC as a political entity

and negotiated with them a demobilisation process. To oversee this process and develop reintegration programmes, a High Commissioner for Peace and Reintegration was established by the President's office and regional offices were created as well. Up to 2008 almost 47,000 persons handed in their weapons.

#### Lessons learned

Virginia Bouvier concluded in *Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War* that greater participation of civil society in various aspects of peacemaking and peacebuilding ensures greater buy-in at the local level and leads to a more durable peace. Peace initiatives such as the peace and development programs focus directly on development and human needs as prerequisites for peace. This combination of peace and development goals seems to hold promise. Some suggest that underutilised institutional structures such as the National Peace Council could be an effective mechanism for channelling civil society participation.

#### The Philippines

In 1986, the People Power Revolution in the Philippines led to the fall of the Marcos dictatorship. The new government initiated peace talks with existing rebel forces in the country. The Office of the Peace Commissioner was established under the Office of the President. Under president Ramos, the post of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) with Cabinet rank was created and charged with the management of the comprehensive peace process and assisted by a fulltime secretariat (OPAPP). The government established Government Peace Negotiating panels for negotiations with the different rebel groups. OPAPP is only a national body; there is no regional peace structure.<sup>19</sup>

### An Independent Peace Structure

As described earlier, Infrastructures for Peace is a broad concept with many modalities, ranging from I4P with a national mandate to informal

Local Peace Committees, independent from the government. In Kenya and Ghana bottom-up processes developed in remote, poor regions; pioneering Regional Peace Committees were created and succeeded in attracting the interest of their governments. Examples of I4P with government leadership can be found in Costa Rica, Peru and Nepal.

### Costa Rica, Peru and Nepal

#### Costa Rica

In 1997, a law for the Alternative Resolution of Conflicts and Promotion of Peace was passed. This law requires peace education in every school. In September 2009, the Costa Rican legislature passed a law changing the name of the country's Justice ministry to the Ministry of Justice and Peace. The new Ministry is working with non-profit organizations to implement a national plan for peace promotion, which includes installing mediation programs in schools all over the country and organising Peace Festivals. Communities are invited to a public place, where peace messages are delivered and a social network is set up to help prevent crime and promote social peace. There is a National Council for Security and Social Peace, in which high government authorities work towards promoting security and peace as a national policy.

#### Peru

Peru is still in the midst of a reconciliation process after the bloody civil war that took place among rural indigenous communities during the 1980s. It also faces a resurgence of the armed guerrilla and increased violence due to conflicts resulting from the exploitation and distribution of natural resources. In 1993, the Ombudsperson Office was established as an autonomous public institution that would defend human rights and promote mediation and conciliation initiatives. In 2008 the government launched a program, in order to lay the groundwork for a Decentralized National System

for Prevention and Constructive Conflict Management and Transformation. It was led by the Council of Ministers (PREVCON), funded by international cooperation; the funds were administered by the UNDP. The central goal was to institutionalise dialogue and peaceful mechanisms for channelling social demands timely and through democratic institutions. The program developed a decentralised approach for building capacities at regional and local level, involving public sector officers and civil society leaders. In October 2012, its profile and name were once more changed: it is now called the National Office of Dialogue and Sustainability (ONDS).

As conflicts in the country increased, each successive prime minister emphasised different approaches within the Conflict Management Unit with either more focus on dialogue and trust building or more on the use of force and detention of opposition leaders. Government and CSOs had widely varying relationships, ranging from ‘partners’ to ‘opponent’. Most observers feel the program helped in the creation of broader capacity building throughout the country, although inconsistencies in government approaches reduced its impact.<sup>20</sup>

### Nepal

The root causes of the conflict in Nepal included feudalism, exclusion of minorities, weak governance and government neglect. The conflict was partly a rural revolt against perceived discrimination and neglect. In 2005 it was decided to establish Local Peace Councils (LPCs), but the implementation was difficult and became contested. The then ruling party, the Nepali Congress, lacked the political will to establish the envisaged High Level Peace Commission as agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006.

The government decided to create a Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in 2007. Some questioned the independence

of the LPCs when they became closely linked with and reliant upon this Ministry, which was run by the Maoist Party at the time. There was reluctance to establish joint multiparty control over the peace architecture. LPCs were established by order from the central government, without the needed local consultations. Some LPCs did function but most failed, due to their lack of local weight and legitimacy.<sup>21</sup>

When Peace structures are designed, one option is to establish them within the government as was done in the examples above. Advantages may be the weight of a government ministry, department or Peace Secretariat, or indeed good coordination with other ministries, especially on issues of security and justice.

Disadvantages may be government dominance, with other stakeholders like civil society taking second place. Also, a more bureaucratic approach is a real danger. If there is a lot of polarization between or within government and political parties, the Ministry of Peace may be partisan and less able to fulfil a bridge-building function. The amount of expertise and capacity recruited from outside (e.g. the community of peacebuilders) may be outweighed by that recruited from within the government. Experience has learned also that governments tend to steer the process in a top-down manner. Also, when a government is weak or corrupt, the peace structure it dominates is doomed to fail.

The Nepal case clearly demonstrates the risks when political parties or the government wants to steer the Peace Infrastructure without (much) consultation. This may kill the legitimacy of the Peace structure and paralyse it.

The other option is a (semi-) independent Peace Infrastructure, as was the case in Ghana and Kenya. Article 30 of the National Peace Council Actor Ghana (2011) states clearly: "*Independence of the Council: Except as provided in the Constitution, the Council shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority in the performance of its functions.*"

Such a policy will be informed by one of the guiding principles of I4P, which is that the main stakeholders must be involved. The government will always play a crucial role in deciding on the mandate it will give to the Peace Infrastructure, in drafting a Policy Paper or a Bill, in deciding on the composition of the Peace Council, etc. By organising consultations with civil society, by asking for nominations for Peace Committee-members and/or by giving respected civil society leaders a prominent role in a National Peace Committee, governments can aim for equal positions of different stakeholders. In Ghana, the National Peace Council consists of thirteen Eminent Persons: eight representatives of religious bodies, other persons nominated by the president, identifiable groups and one representative of the National House of Chiefs.

With an independent peace infrastructure, expertise in peacebuilding, mediation and other capacities can be used more fully. With a government institution, there is a greater possibility for political appointments; civil servants may come from within the government bureaucracy rather than from outside, selected on their peacebuilding capacities. In many countries, politics and government have less legitimacy as compared to respected civil society leaders. Where the need for peace infrastructures and the potential for violent conflict is greater, the ineffectiveness of governments may sometimes be great as well – by its weakness, corruption or not delivering security and justice.

An independent Peace structure maybe more flexible and less expensive. The NPC in Ghana has its own Secretariat, while the Ministry of the Interior –which is in charge of peacebuilding and security – has a small Peacebuilding Support Unit.

The challenge is to find the right balance between independence and a government-steered body. Peacebuilding is an inclusive effort and involves the main stakeholders as equal partners. Too much independence and the government feels too distant with the added risk of having no weight or legitimacy; too little independence and the role of the various stakeholders apart from the government risks being diminished.

Why would a government give a mandate to a semi-independent Peace Infrastructure? It could be because not addressing the underlying roots for violent conflict may cause dormant tensions to flare up and escalate,

for instance during elections. This can ruin the whole social fabric and also undermine the positions of the ruling elite. Working with main stakeholders, for the sake of sustainable peace, may facilitate a climate of stability and may give the ruling government more legitimacy, increase donor funding and foreign investments.<sup>22</sup>

The type of Peace Infrastructure established in Ghana and Kenya is focussed on soft power, on bridge building, confidence building, mediation. Dealing with security and other power issues is still in the hands of the government. Governments that do not consider the wisdom of organising an inclusive and participatory peace structure, may do so at their peril.<sup>23</sup> After all, recent years have not been free from electoral violence.

## Informal Local Peace Committees

In the international debate most attention is focussed on I4P with a national mandate. This makes sense, because such an I4P will have more impact and legitimacy. However, quite a lot of countries have weak/ fragile/collapsing governments or authoritarian regimes, which are not interested in such peace structures. What can people do when their national government will not support them in their pursuit of peacebuilding? The answer, in many countries, has been to create informal Local Peace Committees (LPCs).<sup>24</sup>

LPCs is a generic name for committees or other structures formed at the level of a district, municipality, town or village with the aim to encourage and facilitate joint, inclusive peacemaking and peacebuilding. They often fulfil a useful function in opening a dialogue in a divided community, solving community conflicts and protecting their communities from violence.

What is known about the LPCs' impact? Can they have a role without support of the national government? What hampers them most? And could a bottom-up strategy work in which such LPCs gradually start receiving more support from the regional government and finally get a mandate and support from the national government? Let's learn from some recent experiences.

1. *South Sudan: the Collaborative in South Kordofan*<sup>25</sup>

The Collaborative is a network of local peace activists from Sudan and South Sudan, who have continued to coordinate efforts across the new border. Formed in 2008, the Collaborative has built up twelve peace committees in South Kordofan (Sudan, where the Nuba Mountains are) and Unity State (South Sudan). The Peace Committees are trained to analyse conflict and find locally-led solutions, supported by a Rapid Response Fund (RRF) controlled by the Collaborative where necessary. In most cases the RRF is not needed and costs are covered by community contributions. The Collaborative is partner of the UK-based NGO Peace Direct. For three years, the Collaborative has been working with communities to identify and train local peace activists and coordinate them into a more effective network. As the Peace Committees are entirely voluntary, there is self-selection process, which identifies those people most committed to peacebuilding.

The Peace Committees aim to respond quickly to conflicts, prevent smaller conflicts from escalating and to help communities resist any pressure to become involved in the conflict. In most cases the Peace Committees –with over 70 members– have been supported by the local administration, traditional leaders and even the security forces.

The Peace Committees respond appropriately to the conflicts and according to a recent evaluation:

- in 57 per cent of Peace Committee interventions, communities that previously fought alongside one of the parties, now have chosen not to;
- in 80 per cent of interventions where violence had occurred, no repeated violence has been reported;
- in 94 per cent of interventions, the conflict appears to have been resolved or partially resolved (in 6 per cent of cases the interventions appear to have failed).

Communities in which the Peace Committees are based have mostly been able to resist fighting. The Peace Committees have intervened in over 65 conflicts in three years at the cost of \$170,000 per year to run the project. Clearly, the benefits outweigh the costs.

## 2. *Colombia: Local Peace Communities*<sup>26</sup>

There have been hundreds of LPCs in Colombia, mostly between 1998 and 2002 (see chapter 4). Objectives were to get protection from the surrounding violence, but also to establish participatory democracy and encourage local development. Often CSO leaders started such a process, but also mayors or local administration took the initiative.

Many LPCs started at the end of the 1990s, when peace negotiations started under president Pastrana. The Bogota-based peace organisation REDEPAZ – a network of mostly local and regional peace initiatives – began a project in 1998 to help establish and support new and existing local peace communities (calling it One Hundred Municipalities for Peace). Four years later the project came to an end and was replaced by one that sought to develop local democracy. Under Pastrana's successor president Uribe, government policy changed to a military solution of the 'terrorist problem' and peace communities became targets for the security forces.

The success of LPCs is connected to the degree of involvement by all the community's various groups and sectors. Contributing to its success is also the relationship LPCs establish with existing local power and governance structures (without becoming too dependent). Many LPCs managed to establish (temporarily) increased security. They empowered their members and local civil society. In the absence of strong leadership for peace at the national level, local and regional initiatives were temporarily filling a gap, with some limited success.

## 3. *DRC: Centre Resolution Conflicts (CRC) and LPCs*<sup>27</sup>

Centre Resolution Conflicts (CRC) is a Congolese NGO, working in the eastern DRC province of North Kivu. It was founded in 1993. The UK NGO Peace Direct started a relationship with CRC in 2004. CRC has developed from an organisation focussed on training displaced people to peacefully coexist with members of other tribes into an organisation whose mediation skills are called upon by local communities, international NGOs, multilaterals and local government officials right across North Kivu. CRC is now a member of the UNOCHA protection cluster in the region.

CRC is known for its successful community-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration work in DRC. It has persuaded ex-combatants to leave the bush - and communities to accept them back. In addition, CRC has educated and assisted 20,000 people across two provinces, by helping 14,400 displaced persons to return safely home, rescuing 650 child soldiers and mobilising former enemies to resolve conflicts via mediation and negotiation. Much of CRC's success is based on its ability to engage with armed actors (including rebel groups) and to negotiate the protection of their communities from violence.

Local Committees for Peace are created by CRC. They are non-partisan, a-political frameworks for consultation and analysis, reflection and action of grassroots communities around issues of reconciliation, security and participation in the management of public affairs. Since its inception CRC has set up dozens of Local Peace Committees. Some 20 Peace Committees have evolved into very active Task Forces.

#### 4. *Uganda: Peace Committees in the Karamoja region*<sup>28</sup>

In Uganda, Peace Committees exist in the Karamoja and Acholi regions in the North. Their role is to prevent and resolve conflicts, assess the situation in the field and report or respond to an impending outbreak of violent conflict. They also follow up and recover stolen/raided livestock. One insider reports from interviews with the police and community members that cattle raids have reduced, although cattle theft still occurs. However, road ambushes were reported ceased and a level of peace is returning to Karamoja.

#### 5. *Kenya: the Wajir Peace and Development Committee*<sup>29</sup>

We will describe the example of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in Kenya in some more detail, because of its relevance. During the early 1990s a highly destructive cycle of violent conflict raged in the district of Wajir in the Northeast region between different clans of Kenyan Somalis, leading to 1,213 deaths over a period of 4 years. The violent conflict had its roots in the centuries' old custom of livestock raiding by pastoralist groups. The situation became more violent because of an influx of refugees from neighbouring Somalia

and Ethiopia, increasing aridity, the ready availability of small arms and the very weak presence of government in the district, resulting in the failure of state institutions to regulate conflict and provide security (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1998).

In 1993 a group of women met at the market place and started a discussion on ways to stop the violence. This resulted in a process of peacemaking that is impressive by all accounts. The process basically entailed the formation of a group of civil society actors working together to sensitize the population to the need for peace. They engaged the elders of the different clans and set up a mediation process. After several meetings, the elders agreed to sign a code of conduct, which effectively stopped the violence. In this process civil society actors worked with representatives of formal authority, particularly the District Commissioner and Member of Parliament, but on a voluntary basis.

The initiative was home-grown and locally owned. It was soon realized that the LPC would need some form of formalization to provide coordination to all peacebuilding activities. It was decided to integrate the peace initiatives into one structure that would bring government, NGOs and citizen groups together. This was done in May 1995, when the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was formed, with the District Commissioner as chairperson. Members included the heads of all government departments, representatives of the various peace groups, religious leaders, NGO representatives, traditional chiefs and security officers.

The success of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in bringing peace to the district soon led to the spread of the model to other districts. International donors, NGOs and the National Council of Churches became involved in facilitating and supporting the establishment of local peace committees. In 2001 the government established the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management with the objective to formulate a national policy on conflict management and to provide coordination to various peacebuilding initiatives, including the local peace committees.

Much of the success of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was due to its ability to engage both traditional leadership and

government and to facilitate greater government responsiveness to the needs of the population.

In the aftermath of the post-election violence that wracked Kenya in late 2007/early 2008, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 recommended the establishment of District Peace Committees in all districts, with priority given to the Rift Valley where most of the violence had taken place. During this outburst of violence the Northeastern region was quiet and stable. The infrastructure for peace that has been formalized by the National Accord and Reconciliation Act therefore acknowledged the impact that local peacebuilding had thus far and sought to build on it.

The example of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee is a clear example of how a

bottom-up approach can work and influence and inspire national policies. In Kenya, it took ten years, before the government established the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management. A similar bottom-up process led to the National Peace Council Act in 2011 in Ghana.

#### 6. *Some general remarks on LPCs*

- The work of LPCs is hardly documented; it is very difficult to collect hard data on LPCs.
- Most LPCs were established locally because the local community felt threatened, violence increased, justice and development failed.
- Most LPCs were established by local communities, but they tend to involve representatives of local government.
- LPCs have the potential to influence their local situation, but often not the broader environment. When mass violence escalates, as in DRC, Colombia and Afghanistan, LPCs cannot control the situation anymore. If the broader environment becomes very polarized or violent, they will be gravely affected. If there is no legal and policy framework, the work of LPCs cannot be secured.

Overall, the LPCs' main impact was that they

- solved community problems
- increased local security
- empowered its members
- developed some countervailing power to local government or found ways to cooperate.

## Peaceful Elections and I4P

Elections can be an entry-point for starting a national debate on the need for Infrastructures for Peace.<sup>30</sup> *"Elections are a major catalyst for democratic change but have an intrinsically conflictual nature. Elections make deeply rooted social conflicts more visible and thus have great potential for triggering violence. If such violence is ignited by the electoral process, or perceived to have been, the effects may have grave implications for human rights and local economies, and may create an inherent distrust in the credibility of democracy."*<sup>31</sup>

Elections are structured processes of competition for control of political power. In many countries, a key challenge to the governance and political process is that electoral competitions are a zero-sum game: the winner takes all. Election to public office offers livelihoods and privileges not just for the elected leaders, but also their party supporters, family, clan or ethnic group. Because of the consequences of electoral defeat the incentives to resort to electoral fraud and violence are high. Elections may also make deeply rooted social conflicts visible and provide the opportunity for people to express other grievances.

Following violent elections in Kenya in 2007 and in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010, the international community, national governments and civil society actors are becoming increasingly aware of the need to place a greater emphasis on prevention of electoral violence. The support has so far mainly focussed on strengthening Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), voter registration and electoral monitoring, but this is changing. IDEA has developed a 'three layered approach' for prevention and mitigation of election-related violence: Improved Electoral Management and Justice, Improved Electoral Security and

Improved Infrastructures for Peace.<sup>32</sup> This broader approach is much needed and promising.

Some points are of great value in preparing for peaceful elections, and maybe part of an I4P-policy as well:

- *Start early.* Analysis, planning and measures for the prevention of electoral violence should begin two years or more before elections. The political context 12 to 24 months before an election is often more amenable to peaceful management than the political climate just before elections.
- *Effective, early and joint analysis is critical. Scenario planning can help.* Many of the factors which may contribute to electoral violence in a community/country can be identified months or years in advance. Root causes which give rise to grievances and triggers which may lead to the outbreak of violence can be mapped, identified and addressed/prepared ahead of time.
- *Use a governance and electoral cycle approach.* Elections are not separate from the broader context of politics and governance. In many countries, elections for different offices (president, parliament, local government) may also take place at different times. Preparations for one election can have benefits for the next.
- *Develop national strategies.* Such national strategies are helpful and should include all relevant ministries and state and non-state actors with mandates for elections, peacebuilding or dealing with possible violence.<sup>33</sup>

Many countries have a conflict potential that is not addressed. Elections trigger often those grievances. Broad and more semi-permanent preventing electoral violence programs are needed. This means for the electoral assistance community to include such broader programs in their planning and to analyse the potential for I4P in the planning in their country. The I4Pcommunity should dedicate special attention in their work towards the organising of peaceful elections.

## Does I4P work?

We will describe in more detail in this chapter how Peace Infrastructures in practice have worked and prevented or reduced violence. Not all cases are thoroughly documented; more research is needed to document and assess how and when I4P works.

In Kenya and in Ghana, Regional Peace Committees worked so well that national governments spread the model. Here we will describe these examples in more detail, because the broad consultation processes of main stakeholders are key to the concept of I4P.

### Ghana

In Ghana, 23 violent conflicts were recorded in three northern regions between 1980 and 2002. Many community-based and inter-ethnic conflicts were intractable, because of a failing justice system; many court cases were not resolved. When violence first erupted, the government approach suppressed violence by using force. It then appointed a Commission of Inquiry that allocated blame and often ignored the commission's recommended sanctions.

This approach led to more conflict. It is estimated that up to 5,000 people died as a result of the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict in 1994. The 1994 conflict involved seven ethnic groups. After this eruption, NGOs initiated a different approach by integrating peacebuilding and development work. The thinking was that once communities owned the process of finding mutually acceptable solutions to problems that divided them, development programs could become sustainable. In summary, civil society sought to uncover the deeper sources of conflict and to focus on dialogue, deeper mutual understanding, joint problem-solving and reconciliation.

NGOs formed a working group called the Inter-NGO Consortium. They organised and facilitated a series of peace and reconciliation consultations and workshops among the warring ethnic groups. After negotiations, the delegates agreed to a draft document, which was taken by the delegates to their respective communities for extensive consultations. After four weeks, the delegates returned. Amendments were incorporated in the draft agreement and the Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation was signed March 1996.

When in 2002 another eruption of violence within the Dagombas led to the slaying of the King of Dagbon and many of his elders, this threatened to destabilise the whole region; it would feature as a major campaign issue during the elections. The regional government remembered the innovative approach to solving the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict. In 2004 it established the Northern Region Peace Advisory Council as a mediation and conflict resolution mechanism to deal with the issues of trust among the factions. With the success of the Northern region Peace Advisory Council, the government decided to explore the possibility and relevance of extending the peace council concept to the rest of the country.<sup>34</sup>

The national government sought technical assistance from the United Nations to assist it in designing and implementing a range of activities to build confidence among the factions, create spaces for dialogue between the traditional, business and other elite and build capacity within the leadership of the factions on negotiation and consensus formation. After a process of consultations, a 'roadmap to peace' was signed by the chiefs in Kumasi in March 2006. The outcome of those consultations was a 'national architecture for peace'. The key body of this infrastructure was the National Peace Council.

In December 2008, chieftancy-related conflicts in parts of the country and the discovery of oil led to new tensions as the country approached national elections and the prospects for violence increased. When the elections were held, the narrowest of margins – 50,000 votes – separated the winner from the loser. With tension rising, the National Peace Council helped mediate a peaceful political transition. Emmanuel Bombande from Ghana, founder of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), concluded: "*When it mattered most in an extremely difficult moment during Ghana's elections in 2008, the National Peace Council was there to save Ghana.*"<sup>35</sup>

### Kenya

In Kenya, the success of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee led to the spread of this concept to other districts in the north-eastern part of Kenya. In 2001, the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management was established.

The elections of December 2007 in Kenya were peaceful, but resulted in post-election violence that left some 1,300 people dead and 300,000 displaced. In districts where District Peace Committees had been established, less violence took place than in districts without DPCs. Because of these successes, the government decided to establish DPCs in all 50 districts.

In 2010, a constitutional referendum was held, without any substantial violence. Ahead of the referendum, UNDP provided discreet support for successful national efforts to reach a political agreement on the new draft constitution. It also helped government and civil society implement an early warning and response system (the Uwiano Platform) that prevented more than one hundred incidents of potential violence in the volatile Rift valley alone. Local peace committees were strengthened in all of the country's districts and played a critical role during the referendum.<sup>36</sup>

### South Africa<sup>37</sup>

The transition from apartheid South Africa and an emerging democracy was served by a well-developed peace architecture; local peace committees were the main structure that prevented or reduced violence. These committees operated between 1991 and 1994 and were terminated following the successful national elections of April 1994. The pioneering nature of South Africa's peace committees drew the attention of other countries as a model that might be copied. Ball estimates that "*... the peace committee concept is transferable, but the precise form such committees assume should be developed locally*".

South African local peace committees were a product of its National Peace Accord (NPA), signed in September 1991 between the main protagonists in the conflict. Twenty-seven South African parties and institutions signed the NPA, including the government, most political parties, major liberation movements, business, churches and others. The main reason for establishing the NPA was to respond to the country's escalating violence that had killed more than 6,000 people between 1985 and 1990. The National Peace Accord was not a peace agreement in the strict sense of the word; it was essentially a code of conduct that bound the signatories to a set of mutually agreed ground rules. The peace architecture consisted of:

- A National Peace Committee with representatives of all signatories;
- Regional Peace Committees in all 11 regions of the country;
- Local Peace Committees in all affected areas;
- A National Peace Secretariat to establish and coordinate regional and local peace committees.

The main tasks of LPCs were to:

- create trust and reconciliation between community leaders, including the police and army;
- prevent violence and intimidation;
- resolve disputes that could lead to public violence.

Several studies (especially Ball and Spies, 1998) have assessed the impact of LPCs. Some observations are:

- the LPCs contributed towards containing the spiral of violence—despite the fact that the number of violent deaths increased during the lifetime of the LPCs.
- LPCs facilitated local dialogue and (for the first time) assemblies of stakeholders made up of all relevant categories of participants were able to address local issues jointly.

### **Guyana**

In 2006, after a period of rising political tension, Guyana conducted its first ever violence-free election. An independent external evaluation conclusively attributed this result to a UNDP-supported national initiative known as the Social Cohesion Programme. A national dialogue, a network of local mediators to help ease tensions among communities and agreements among political parties were some of the instruments used.<sup>38</sup>

### **Cost of conflict and of conflict prevention, including I4P**

The establishment of I4P in some countries, has cost the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) no more than a

few million US dollars. BCPR is now involved in the establishment of I4P in countries as Kenya, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Togo, Ivory Coast, Uganda and several more.

Building sustainable Peace is crucial. Too often, we support fragmented peacebuilding activities that do not add up and are not strengthening each other. Too often, we stop the support after some years, while we know this needs to be a long time investment. Establishing sustainable peace mechanisms, capacities and structures requires an investment of at least ten years. But the gains are enormous: stable countries, with severely reduced risks of falling back in conflicts.

There is a need of a Programme or Fund for sustainable national infrastructures for Peace, set up by governments, foundations, the private sector and CSOs. In this phase, it may cost perhaps 20-30 million dollars a year; within ten years the result may be 10-15 stable countries, with a solid peace-agenda and prospects for development. Such a Programme or Fund should be gradually expanded, to include more countries aiming for I4P.

In Kenya, the leading business association put economic losses from post-election violence in 2008 at US\$ 3.6 billion. Two years later, prior to the 2010 constitutional referendum, a UNDP-supported violence prevention effort identified and pre-empted nearly 150 incidents of violence and helped political parties reach consensus on the draft constitution before the vote. There was no violence and by contrast the exercise cost only US\$ 5 million.

According to the Ghana Investment Promotion Council, direct foreign investment in the country jumped 90 percent between mid-2008 and mid-2009. The intervening variable was the peaceful national poll in December 2008. The National Peace Council, with approximately 2 million dollar financial support from UNDP, played a crucial mediation role in averting expected turbulence. Expectations of violence had depressed investment prior to the poll.<sup>39</sup>

Compare these amounts: the annual expense for peacekeeping is around US\$ 8 billion; the Peacebuilding Fund for post-conflict peacebuilding cost US\$ 350 million. The resources available for establishing infrastructures for peace are a pittance, about US\$ 3

million a year!<sup>40</sup> As a result, key initiatives are often not continued after the first year or two despite concrete results, and UNDP and DPA scrounge for funds to continue the deployment of peace and development advisers and similar specialists.

## Lessons learnt and some challenges

Let us summarise some important lessons and challenges as regards I4P.

- *Broad diversity of activities/mechanisms and tools:* Many approaches seem to work. Further research should indicate which tools, etc. work best under which conditions.
- *A semi-independent peace structure seems best:* an I4P involves the government and other stakeholders at all levels. The involvement of all stakeholders is crucial. It is therefore important to establish a Peace Infrastructure with the government as one of the pillars, without it steering the whole process. Too often, government dominates and other stakeholders feel marginalized. In polarized situations, governments may be paralysed, rendering an independent peace structure a more preferable option.
- *Local Peace Committees fulfil important roles:* they can fill a void in dispute resolution in local governance and are particularly effective during transitional periods. LPCs can open a dialogue in a divided community, solve community conflicts and protect their community from violence.
- *More permanent structures & funding is needed:* aiming for sustainable peace and development means establishing permanent peace structures. This requires long-term investments such as a Peace Infrastructure. The normal pattern of funding for two or three years is not appropriate.
- *Developing a research agenda:* research issues should include the mandate and tasks of NPCs, how a Peace Infrastructure relates to other state institutions, the composition of Peace Committees, impact and evaluation of I4P and many other topics.
- *Peaceful elections:* the existence of an I4P substantially increases the chances of peaceful elections by having a network and structure

re. Related points include: linking the different levels and sectors/actors, early warning and response system and the capacities for conflict prevention and mediation.

- *Need for an international civil society network on I4P*: with the increasing interest in I4P and LPCs and the establishment of I4P in more countries, it is evident that we need an international I4P civil society network to exchange experiences between different stakeholders, reach out to a broader community and do advocacy work. Such a network has to be linked to other important stakeholders as governments and UN/BCPR.

## Concluding remarks

Increasingly, violent conflicts are a reality around elections, during the hunt for resources or in collapsing countries. West Africa experienced recently conflicts in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Mali. It is urgently needed to analyse how we could enhance sustainable peace within countries. Establishing Infrastructures for Peace could be an important pillar for such a plan.

More focus should be given to long-term investment in capacities, mechanisms and structures for sustainable peace. A substantial increase in funds for I4P is needed. An International Civil Society Network on Infrastructures for Peace recently has been established, with some thirty NGOs, LPCs and networks, mainly from Southern countries. The Network's new website will be launched in January 2013 ([www.infrastructuresforpeaceinternational.org](http://www.infrastructuresforpeaceinternational.org)).<sup>41</sup>

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Most of the documents listed above can be found on the website [www.infrastructuresforpeaceinternational.org](http://www.infrastructuresforpeaceinternational.org)

#### ABSTRACT

### **Creating Infrastructures for Peace– Experiences at three continents**

Peace can be planned. In most cases violent escalation of conflicts can be prevented. Countries at risk of instability and civil war need mechanisms and structures for cooperation amongst all relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding. Institutional structures for peace create a forum for all peace actors for dialogue and cooperation. Evidence demonstrates that peace structures work. The article elaborates on the components of peace infrastructures and describes experiences in three continents. To build on the experiences and to explore the further potential of these peace structures, an International Civil Society Network on Infrastructures for Peace has recently been established.

#### RESUMEN

### **La creación de infraestructuras para la paz– Experiencias en tres continentes**

La paz puede ser planeada. En la mayoría de los casos, la escalada violenta de los conflictos puede prevenirse. Los países que se encuentran en riesgo de inestabilidad y guerra civil necesitan mecanismos y estructuras para posibilitar la cooperación de todos los actores involucrados en la construcción de la paz. Las estructuras institucionales para la paz generan un espacio de diálogo y cooperación para todos los actores de la paz. Ha quedado demostrado que las estructuras para la paz funcionan.

Este artículo ahonda en los componentes de las infraestructuras para la paz y describe experiencias en tres continentes. Recientemente se ha creado una Red Internacional de la Sociedad Civil para el desarrollo de Infraestructuras para la Paz para capitalizar esas experiencias y explorar el potencial adicional de las estructuras para la paz.

#### SUMMARIO

#### **A criação de infra-estruturas para a paz: Experiências em três continentes**

A paz pode ser planejada. Na maioria dos casos, a escalada violenta dos conflitos pode ser prevenida. Os países que se encontram em risco de instabilidade e guerra civil necessitam de mecanismos e estruturas para possibilitar a cooperação de todos os atores envolvidos na construção da paz. As estruturas institucionais para a paz geram um espaço de diálogo e cooperação para todos os atores da paz. Ficou demonstrado que as estruturas para a paz funcionam. Este artigo aprofunda a abordagem dos componentes das infra-estruturas para a paz e descreve experiências em três continentes. Criada recentemente, a Rede Internacional da Sociedade Civil para o Desenvolvimento de Infra-estruturas para a Paz tem como objetivo capitalizar essas experiências e explorar o potencial adicional das estruturas para a paz.

## Cuba, Estados Unidos y América Latina frente a los desafíos hemisféricos

Luis Fernando Ayerbe (Coord.). *Cuba, Estados Unidos y América Latina frente a los desafíos hemisféricos*. Buenos Aires: CRIES, Instituto de Estudios Económicos e Internacionais, Icaria Editorial, 2011. 272 págs.

Desde la instalación del gobierno originario de la revolución, la inserción internacional adquiere para Cuba un significado estratégico próximo a la sobrevivencia, tornándose referencia central de su política exterior, asumiendo los costos que implica estar en el lado opuesto de los alineamientos de la Guerra Fría promovidos por su gran vecino del norte, que en los años 1990 se transforma en la única superpotencia global. Buscando salir del aislamiento patrocinado por Estados Unidos, Cuba consigue en los años recientes redefinir sus relaciones exteriores, estableciendo vínculos importantes con países de la Unión Europea, Asia y de su entorno regional.

La trayectoria que acabamos de presentar es el objeto de estudio de los artículos que componen este libro, que reúne los aportes de académicos de universidades y centros de investigación de Argentina, Brasil, Cuba, Estados Unidos, México y Venezuela. La perspectiva de análisis adoptada busca establecer un diálogo desde la diversidad nacional de los entornos institucionales de sus autores, tomando como eje la comparación de los desafíos enfrentados por Cuba en su inserción regional, partiendo de los lineamientos de su política exterior en función de los intereses y objetivos visualizados por el Estado, los contextos cambiantes de la realidad hemisférica desde 1959, y las relaciones bilaterales con tres actores destacados, Estados Unidos, Venezuela y Brasil.

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