The UN Secretary-General's January 2012 Report on conflict-related sexual violence will inform a Security Council Debate on the issue this Thursday, 23 February 2012. In the text of the report, the Secretary-General calls on various actors including parties to conflict, donors, the UN Security Council and UN Member States to consider and address conflict-related sexual violence in all their engagements. In his final recommendations the Secretary-General urges that peacekeeping measures, justice mechanisms, mediation teams, early warning systems, and services for survivors such as reparations should specifically address conflict-related sexual violence. However the report fails to highlight three key issues relevant to success: a stronger focus on prevention measures that involve all conflict actors; emphasizing women's agency in conflict and in peace processes; and encouraging a stronger involvement of civil society in all measures taken.

The report's first weakness lies in its prioritization of pursuing justice after crimes have been committed, rather than placing greater value in preventive measures and solutions during actual conflict. Such an approach, taking into account the complicated realities of reconciliation processes after (and even during) conflict, threatens long-term methods of dealing with conflict-related sexual violence in societies where victims and perpetrators must often live door to door again one day. In many cases, both victims and perpetrators are likely to become prejudiced against and isolated from their communities if the primary focus is on delivering punitive justice only. Despite the great importance of avoiding widespread impunity for these crimes, sexual violence in a conflict, or conflict-related setting, should be approached more readily in the context of the conflict and the affected community itself, and should afford individuals - including perpetrators - various options to change (and atone for) their behavior.

Secondly, the UNSG's report should place more emphasis on recognizing the role (and great potential role) of women as actors in conflict, including their unique and critical contributions to mediation and prevention. Portraying women as agents of change and power, rather than focusing on women as victims in conflict is essential to this message. The UN has a unique role to play here in highlighting the work that is happening on the ground and changing the way women’s roles in conflict are reported on. And as the UN, it has a responsibility to act in this regard. More broadly, the report could have done more to encourage a holistic approach to combating sexual violence in conflict through more long-term and socially-conscious preventive measures such as education, greater participation of women in policymaking, and supporting local initiatives that address violence in society at a broader level.

Thirdly, the report fails to truly highlight civil society as an actor with the potential to effect positive change in this context. Civil society is mentioned but three times in the 30-page document. This is a missed opportunity for the Secretary-General to document what work is taking place at the local level, where women and men engage in conflict prevention efforts, including preventing (and preventing the re-occurrence of) sexual violence in conflict. The report is a further missed opportunity in documenting positive action as a counterweight to predominantly negative reflections on this topic.

Rather than encouraging all actors to reflect on sexual violence, the UN Secretary-General's report would have done well to:

Address protection from sexual violence from a prevention angle, and protection of women specifically through their increased participation in conflict prevention;

Complement justice for victims/survivors and the prosecution of perpetrators with long-term approaches to prevent the resurgence of violence, many of which are implemented by civil society on the ground but still need to be strengthened and supported.

 Justine Brouillaud, New York Liaison, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict

Gesa Bent, Coordinator Gender, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Global Secretariat in The Hague 

Tomorrow, the 23^rdof February, representatives of governments, the UN, and regional inter-governmental organizations, such as the African Union and Arab League, will gather in London for the Somalia Conference (organized by the FCO UK). The aim of the conference is to develop a new international approach towards the most pressing issues related to Somalia, including counter-terrorism, humanitarianism and local stability. News on the conference can be followed through twitter and blogs. For further information, check http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/somalia-conference/.

The contrast between Northern Kosovo’s Serb majority and Pristina’s ethnic Albanian-run state apparatus has reached a new low point. The results of a controversial referendum held on 14-15 February showed the entity of the local population’s disaffection from Kosovo’s institutions. The plebiscite is however unlikely to improve the link between Serb Kosovars and Serbia, rather remarking Northern Kosovo’s detachment from the process of normalisation of the relations between Pristina and Belgrade.

Northern Kosovo’s resistance to the consolidation of Pristina’s administration depends on local Serbs’ consideration of the area as their last stand after the loss of the rest of the country to an ethnic Albanian majority. The presence of parallel Serbian and Kosovar institutions in the area leads to a de facto situation of dual sovereignty over the territory. However, Belgrade’s control over local leaders is decreasing.

During 2011, Northern Kosovars' resistance to Pristina’s attempts to secure its border with Serbia already caused the failure of EU-sponsored talks between the countries. The recent referendum, which showed the rejection of Kosovo’s institutions by 99% of the participants, therefore remarked that little progress has been made in addressing the concerns of the local population.

The plebiscite organised unilaterally by local authorities did not achieve the expected results. Belgrade discouraged Kosovar Serbs from holding the referendum, fearing that it would compromise Serbia’s ability to reach EU candidate status by complicating its relations with Pristina. On the other hand, Kosovo’s PM Thaçi contested the legality of the vote, regarding it as a violation of the country’s territorial integrity and considering Belgrade responsible for it.

The referendum therefore did not contribute to a breakthrough in the definition of the status of the disputed territory. The vote instead pointed out the impasse of the local population, and the necessity of an active engagement of its leaders as relevant stakeholders in the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade in the future.

Ettore Marchesoni, GPPAC

In ‘How did we forget about mutually assured destruction’ of 15 Feb. 2012 Tom de Castella questions why the Cold War fear of an all-out nuclear war has faded. For a lot of people this might be because of the unknown that nuclear weapons represent. Obviously we all know they are highly dangerous, but it is hard to imagine what this danger truly entails. It is hard to fear the unthinkable. However, maybe we should be more afraid of nuclear weapons today than ever.

Firstly, during the Cold War period the deterrence was based on the idea that the potential response of nuclear weapon states if attacked would be so devastating that it would serve as a preventive measure. Yet, the divide was clear. The US versus the Soviet Union made it clear who needed to fear whom. Even if not counting those States that are suspected of having or developing nuclear weapons, the increasing number of players that possess these weapons today has assured that such a balancing act has become a lot more unstable.

Secondly, history has taught us that we should not only fear ‘them’ having nuclear power, but we should also be worried about our own nuclear capabilities. Aside from having shown that nuclear weapon states are not above testing their weapons at the expense of other nations, as exemplified in the Pacific. The risks that come with having nuclear plants have become undeniable. This was shown most clearly with the disasters in Chernobyl and Fukushima.

Thirdly, holding on to nuclear weapons implies that governments believe that there is a scenario thinkable in which it would be not only legitimate to use them, but also strategically controllable. If not, they become a hollow threat and therefore useless altogether. With more than 17,000 warheads around the world, that assumption is not only somewhat arrogant, it is also very risky.

Instead, we should recognize that nuclear weapons have never brought the security they were supposed to bring – even the Cold War was for many parts of the world not so cold at all – and start with the development and implementation of a strategy to move towards nuclear abolition. The lead in such abolition should be taken by the original nuclear weapon states – the USA, UK, France, Russia and China. The trust other countries need to have in these powers to not dismiss their own nuclear ambitions has already proved to be fragile. 

However, for such a discussion to start, the people of these countries need to demand of their political and military leaders to do the unthinkable and abolish nuclear weapons. A demand that might have more clout if we realized there is still a reason to be afraid.

Marte Hellema is Regional Coordinator Asia Pacific and Programme Manager Public Outreach at the Global Secretariat of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)

Last week, the Canadian government published their first ever counterterrorism strategy “Building Resilience Against Terrorism”. At first glance, it’s encouraging  to see human rights and the rule of law being identified as guiding principles for the strategy. This is a practice which has been sorely lacking in the last 10 years. However, on reading the rest of the document, it turns out that these words ring hollow. A number of contradictions lead me to believe that 10 years after 9/11, anti-Islam sentiment lives on.

First of all, the identification of Sunni Islamist extremism as the leading threat to Canada’s national security perpetuates a dangerous narrative against Muslim communities. It runs counter to the strategy’s commitment to engage with minority communities, and will only contribute to anti-Islam sentiment. Moreover, statements such as "it remains to be seen how events occurring across MENA affect the terrorist threat" does not instill any confidence in the Canadian government's committment to understanding the nature of terrorism and violent extremism.  

Second, the overwhelming emphasis on Islamic extremism over ‘domestic issue-based extremism’ fails to attribute any sense of proportionality – though the strategy strives for proportional responses. It is worth noting reports in the media which suggest violent extremism relating to white supremacy (which is identified as a domestic issue-based threat, alongside environmentalism, anti-capitalism and animal rights) poses a larger security threat. This despite white supremacy being mentioned only once in the entire strategy. Minister for Public Safety Vic Toews asserts that  "Terrorism is not specific to any one religion, community or ethnic group". The rhetoric of his strategy suggests otherwise.

Third, though human rights and respect for the rule of law are mentioned throughout the strategy, it is questionable the extent to which these considerations will be accounted for in the face of a perceived threat. As the strategy states, “individual rights, such as the right to due process, need to be balanced with the need to protect national security sources and methods”. Once again, human rights and rule of law are placed secondary to security.

In a time when civil liberties are continuously being threatened by repressive counterterrorism measures, some may be led to believe the government of Canada have adopted a more comprehensive, nuanced approach. However this would be a mistake. The anti-Islamic undertones of the strategy cannot go ignored (as it has largely been in the media), and point to a broader problem - that it is taken as a given that the primary terrorist threat is rooted in Islamic fundamentalism. The continual conflation of Islam with terrorism is deeply troubling and suggests we have not really moved on since the draconian times immediately following 9/11.

Equally troubling in the Canadian strategy is the appearance of respect for human rights and the rule of law in implementing counterterrorism measures. It is not enough to simply write the words. One must actually take these considerations in account. When Vic Towes asks “Information obtained by torture is always discounted, but the problem is, can one safely ignore it if Canadian lives and property are at stake?”, I fear these guiding principles will soon be forgotten.    

Shireen Lau, Programme Assistant at the Global Partnerhsip for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)